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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN KOCHER, 
Petitioner-Appellant, Case No. 940141-CA 
v. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS and # Priority No. 3 
SCOTT CARVER, Warden, : 
Respondents-Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner, a now-paroled third degree felon, appeals from the 
district court's dismissal of his pro se petition for extraordinary 
relief from respondent Utah Board of Pardons' rescission of his 
parole date. The petition was brought under Rule 65B(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on grounds that respondents had 
wrongfully restrained petitioner's personal liberty, but was 
decided under subsection (e) of the rule as a claim of wrongful use 
of judicial authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (Supp. 1994) 
grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from petitions 
challenging Board decisions that do not involve a first degree or 
capitol felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
!• Did the district court correctly consider the petition 
under Rule 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
In reviewing dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief, 
an appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law 
without deference for correctness. Rawlinas v. Holden. 869 P.2d 
958, 960 (Utah App. 1994); accord. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 
839 P.2d 874# 876 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Did the district court err in determining that the Board 
of Pardons regularly pursued its authority in rescinding 
petitioner's parole date? 
On appeal from the dismissal of a petition for extraordinary 
relief, the reviewing court surveys the record in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment and will not reverse if the 
record provides a reasonable basis to support the trial court's 
decision. Northern v. Barnes. 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993); accord. 
Padilla. 839 P.2d at 876; Hall v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 806 P.2d 
217# 217 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before the Court is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order entered by the trial court on 
February 8, 1994 (Addendum A, R. 57-59), dismissing petitioner's 
claim that respondents violated his due process rights in 
rescinding his parole date. The trial court held that the claims 
were properly cognizable not under Rule 65B(b) or (c) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, but under subsection (e) of the rule. 
See Addendum A at R. 57-58. Finding that petitioner did not show 
any actions in which respondents failed to follow applicable law, 
exceeded their authority, or abused their discretion, the court 
denied the relief requested by petitioner and granted respondents' 
motion to dismiss the petition. See id. at R. 58. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On October 12, 1993, petitioner filed his petition for 
extraordinary relief in the Third District Court (R. 2-7) . 
Alleging jurisdiction under Rule 65B(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, petitioner claimed that respondents had violated his due 
process rights by rescinding his parole date based on a flawed 
prison disciplinary action. Although the petition states that 
petitioner attached supporting affidavits, records, and other 
evidence (see R. 5 at 1 7) , the sole attachment to the petition 
contained in the court's record is petitioner's own affidavit 
simply repeating the general allegations of the petition (R. 7). 
Two days later, the district court judge ruled that the petition 
was not frivolous and ordered respondents to answer pursuant to 
Rule 65B(c)(5). R. 9-11. 
On October 29, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the 
petition and a supporting memorandum. R. 14-35. In support of 
their motion, respondents argued that the petition failed to state 
a claim of unlawful restraint cognizable under Rule 65B(c). 
Petitioner responded by moving to strike the motion to dismiss and 
requesting a hearing. R. 38-46. 
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A hearing was held on December 12, 1993, and respondents' 
motion to dismiss was granted. R. 56. On March 2, 1994, following 
the trial court's February 8, 1994 order of dismissal (Addendum A, 
R. 57-59) , attorney David S. Steed entered an appearance of counsel 
on petitioner's behalf (R. 60-61) and filed a notice of appeal (R. 
62-63). 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
At the time the petition was filed, petitioner, a convicted 
felon, was confined to the Utah State Prison on third degree felony 
convictions of theft and auto theft (R. 24 and 27) following 
revocation of a prior parole (R. 32) . At the time of his 
revocation hearing, petitioner was given a new parole date of 
August 24, 1993. R. 32. However, on June 16, 1993, the Board of 
Pardons advised petitioner by letter that it had received a 
rescission request based on unspecified prison disciplinary 
actions. Addendum B, R. 45. The letter requested petitioner to 
prepare to appear for a rescission hearing at the prison before a 
Board staff member on June 30, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. The letter also 
enumerated six categories of information contained in petitioner's 
Board file that could be considered, and noted that "[a]ny other 
specific items of information to be considered by the Board will be 
identified for you at the hearing and you will have an opportunity 
to respond at that time." Id. at R. 45. 
At the June 30, 1993 hearing, the Board entered an interim 
order rescinding the August parole date and granting a new date of 
December 14, 1993. Addendum C at R. 29. Although the Board noted 
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employment possibilities, a meaningful support system, and 
acceptance of responsibility for some conduct as positive factors, 
it determined the rescission to be appropriate based on aggravating 
circumstances including denial or minimization of responsibility 
for other conduct; repeated, numerous incarcerations or parole 
revocation; a lack of participation in appropriate prison 
programming; and prison disciplinary problems or other defiance of 
authority. Addendum C at R. 30. The interim decision was affirmed 
on July 13, 1993. Addendum D, R. 26-27. 
On October 12, 1993, petitioner filed his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus and postconviction relief in the Third District Court 
(R. 2-7), claiming that respondents had violated his due process 
rights by relying on false information in rescinding his parole 
date (R. 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents do not disagree with petitioner's premise that 
petitions for extraordinary relief are available to seek review of 
certain actions of the Board of Pardons. They do, however, 
disagree with petitioner's understanding of the nature and scope of 
that review. As held by the court below and not contested here, 
the claims made by petitioner are properly characterized as claims 
that the Board of Pardons, an administrative agency, wrongfully 
used its judicial authority by exceeding its jurisdiction, abusing 
its discretion, or failing to act in accordance with applicable law 
pursuant to Rule 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Under subsection (e)(4), the district court's role can extend no 
further than assuring that the Board, in its actions, regularly 
pursued its authority. The fact that petitioner disagrees with the 
outcome of his rescission hearing is insufficient to show legal 
error on the Board's part. 
Petitioner's reliance on the alleged mishandling of his prison 
disciplinary action is misplaced. By his own admission, he 
explained his concerns to the Board. By providing petitioner the 
opportunity to rebut claimed errors in the disciplinary 
proceedings, the Board provided him appropriate due process. 
Having entertained his explanation, the Board was entitled to weigh 
it against other considerations in determining that rescission was 
nonetheless warranted. 
The court found that petitioner did not establish facts 
showing either an abuse of the Board's discretion or a failure by 
respondents to follow statutes, rules, or regulations governing 
their actions. Petitioner has not marshalled the evidence in favor 
of the court's findings as precedent requires. Moreover, 
petitioner's failure to provide a transcript of the district court 
hearing, as required by rule when findings or conclusions are 
challenged, precludes a showing that the findings lack a sufficient 
evidentiary basis. In light of these deficiencies, the findings 
must be accepted as valid, and review is limited to a determination 
of whether the court's legal conclusions are consistent with those 
findings. Since the facts as found by the court show no instances 
of violative conduct by respondents, the court's conclusion that 
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respondents regularly pursued their authority is inescapable. 
Petitioner has not shown that the Board of Pardons violated 
his due process rights in any way. Because the Board regularly 
pursued its authority in rescinding his parole date, he is not 
entitled to relief, and the district court's dismissal of his 
petition must be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED THE 
PETITION UNDER RULE 65B(e) OB1 THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Petitioner acknowledges and does not contest the propriety of 
the district court's ruling that petitioner's claims are 
appropriately actionable under subsection (e) of Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brief of Appellant at 6, 1 o. 
Nonetheless, his arguments cm appeal do not address whether 
respondents regularly pursued their authority in rescinding his 
parole date. Instead, petitioner argues that the substance of the 
Board's decision is wrong because of underlying flaws in a prison 
disciplinary action considered by the Board in its decisionmaking 
process. In effect, petitioner seeks this Court's review of the 
merits of the Board's determination, a result precluded not only by 
statute but by binding precedent. 
As worded at the time of the district court's order of 
dismissal, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1993) stated that 
n
 [d]ecisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles, 
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pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or 
remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to 
judicial review."1 As petitioner correctly points out, Foote v. 
Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), established that 
despite this provision, review of Board actions is available in 
certain circumstances. However, as settled by binding authority, 
the scope of that review is limited to an examination of procedural 
due process pursuant to Rule 65B(e). 
In Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons. 869 P.2d 945 (Utah 
1994), the supreme court established both the rationale for the 
application of subsection (e) and the parameters of a subsection 
(e) review. Lancaster sought relief against the Board for, among 
other things, failing to fix a definite release date. The petition 
alleged jurisdiction under both subsections (c) and (e) of Rule 
65B. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of th6 
petition as frivolous. The court rejected consideration of 
Lancaster's claims under subsection (c), holding that, 
[a]s explained in Labrum, we must review 
the fairness of the process by which the Board 
undertakes its sentencing function, but we do 
not sit as a panel of review on the result, 
absent some other constitutional claim, such 
as cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, 
Lancaster's claim under Rule 65B(c) was 
properly dismissed as frivolous on its face. 
Lancaster. 869 P. 2d at 947 (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Scrutinizing the claims under Rule 65B(e), the court 
Effective May 2, 1994, the provision was amended to add the 
words "and Parole" after "Board of Pardons", but the substance of 
the provision remained unchanged. 
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determined that the dismissal was warranted by Lancaster's failure 
to allege "facts showing that the Board failed to act as required 
by law, exceeded its jurisdiction, abused its discretion, or 
refused him a right to which he was entitled." Id. at 948. 
The application of subsection (e) to claims against the Board 
was most recently upheld in Preece v. House, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 
(Utah November 23, 1994). Preece challenged his Board-established 
parole date on several grounds, including the Board's alleged 
consideration of a prison disciplinary report that was supposed to 
have been expunged from his file. The supreme court found Preece's 
petition appropriate under subsection (e), see Preece. 252 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 12, and relied on Lancaster to reject review of the 
Board's substantive decision. See id. 
As in Preece and Lancaster, petitioner is entitled to a review 
of the procedure by which the Board reached its decision regarding 
his parole date. Likewise, as in these controlling precedents, he 
is entitled to no more. Statute and case law mandate affirmance of 
the court's application of Rule 65B(e) to petitioner's case. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE FACTS SHOWING THAT 
RESPONDENTS ACTED IN VIOLATION OF LAW, 
EXCEEDED THEIR JURISDICTION, ABUSED THEIR 
DISCRETION, OR DENIED A RIGHT TO WHICH 
PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED. 
To succeed in his Rule 65B(e) claim, petitioner can obtain 
relief only on the following grounds: 
(A) where an inferior court, administrative 
agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
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abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, corporation or 
person has failed to perform an act required 
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; 
or (C) where an inferior court, administrative 
agency, corporation or person has refused the 
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or 
office to which petitioner is entitled. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e)(2). As the court below properly found and 
the record sustains, petitioner did not adduce evidence 
demonstrating that respondents committed any such violation. 
Petitioner argues extensively in his brief that the Board's 
rescission action is defective because the record before the Board 
included an allegedly flawed prison disciplinary proceeding. 
Petitioner's attack is misguided. Any error committed by prison 
authorities in the disciplinary proceeding is simply irrelevant to 
the issue of whether the Board violated petitioner's rights and 
goes to the merits of the Board's parole determination, a function 
"certainly well within the Board's discretion." Lancaster. 869 
P.2d at 947. Indeed, as the -supreme court noted in Preece. 252 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 12, "so long as the period of incarceration 
decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's 
applicable indeterminate range, e.g., five years to life, then that 
decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and 
capricious." Petitioner has shown no unusual circumstances here. 
Even assuming, solely for the purpose of argument, that the 
prison's disciplinary action were flawed as petitioner contends, 
petitioner has shown no impropriety by respondents that would 
entitle him to relief against them. Petitioner has made no claim 
that the Board used constitutionally defective procedures in its 
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decisionmaking process. He has not alleged that the Board provided 
inadequate notice of his rescission hearing. He has not claimed 
that the Board, in contemplating the rescission request, failed to 
advise him of the evidence that could be considered, prevented him 
from raising or responding to relevant issues, or denied any 
request for additional information. He has not asserted that the 
Board declined to provide an adequate written rationale for its 
rescission of his parole date. His sole claim against respondents 
is a challenge to the substance of the decision rescinding his 
parole date, not to the procedure by which that decision was 
reached. Although he complains that prison officials not made 
parties to this suit violated his rights in disciplining him for an 
infraction of prison rules, he does not claim that the respondents 
he has brought under the Court's jurisdiction bear any 
responsibility for those alleged violations. 
Petitioner mischaracterizes the Board's rescission of his 
parole date as resulting from an "automatic recision provision.11 
See Brief of Appellant at 1. In contrast, the record reveals a 
course of deliberation that was anything but automatic. After 
receiving a rescission request based on multiple disciplinaries, 
the Board scheduled and advised petitioner of a hearing "to discuss 
this matter." Addendum B, R. 45. Following petitioner's 
explanation to the Board, an interim decision rescinding 
petitioner's parole date was entered on June 30, 1993 (Addendum C 
at R. 29), and a written rationale was provided (id. at R. 30) . 
The interim decision was reviewed and affirmed by the Board on July 
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13, 1993 (Addendum D at R. 26), and a new order of parole was 
entered (id. at R. 27) . Far from the automatic process that 
petitioner suggests, the Board's action represents an individual 
determination in which petitioner was afforded a full opportunity 
to air his concerns in accordance with due process. 
The record before the Board included much more than a single 
prison disciplinary proceeding. As enumerated in the June 16, 1993 
letter advising petitioner of his rescission hearing, petitioner's 
complete Board file was open for the Board's consideration, 
including 
(1) Public information, including 
judgment and commitment orders, prior 
Board dispositions, parole agreements, 
and the like; 
(2) Information generated from Adult 
Probation and Parole, including 
presentence and postsentence reports, 
probation violation reports, parole 
progress and violation reports, 
diagnostic reports, and so forth; 
(3) Prison information, including board 
reports, disciplinaries. progress and 
rescission reports, psychologicals, etc.; 
(4) Information generated internally for 
the Board, including worksheets, 
routings, guideline matrices, alienist 
reports, warrant requests; 
(5) Other criminal justice information, 
including police and prosecutorial 
reports, recommendations from sentencing 
judges, criminal record data, other court 
documents; 
(6) Other correspondence sent to the 
Board concerning you. 
Any other specific items of information to be 
considered by the Board will be identified for 
you at the hearing and you will have an 
opportunity to respond at that time. 
Addendum B, R. 45 (emphasis supplied). 
Because petitioner attacks the court's finding that 
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respondents engaged in no conduct violative of his rights, he is 
obligated to marshal the evidence in support of the court's 
finding. The Supreme Court of Utah has outlined an appellant's 
burden: 
An appellate court does not lightly disturb 
the verdict of a jury nor the findings of fact 
made by a trial court. If a challenge is made 
to the findings, an appellant must marshall 
all evidence in favor of the facts as found by 
the trial court and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding of fact. 
If the appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial 
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy 
of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law to the case. 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). As this Court 
has elaborated, " [sluccessful challenges to findings of fact thus 
must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court 
found the facts from the evidence and second why such findings 
contradict the weight of the evidence." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage and Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994) . 
Petitioner here has taken neither step. 
Petitioner does not claim that he was unable to raise his 
concerns about the disciplinary action against him to the Board. 
By petitioner's own admission, he explained to the Board the errors 
he perceived in the disciplinary action on which his petition 
focuses. See R. 48. However, the Board's written rationale for 
its decision shows that on balance, the Board considered the 
aggravating circumstances of denial and minimization of 
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responsibility, petitioner's incarceration and revocation history 
(see R. 32), his programming record, and his prison disciplinary 
problems to favor delay of his parole by less than four months. 
See Addendum C at R. 30. On appeal, petitioner leaves wholly 
unaddressed this record evidence of respondents' appropriate 
exercise of discretion. He shows neither how the court used the 
evidence before it to find respondents in compliance with their 
legal duty, nor why the weight of the evidence requires a different 
result. Petitioner's failure to meet his burden of marshalling 
mandates affirmance of the court's findings: respondents did not 
fail to follow governing statutes, rules, or regulations, did not 
exceed their authority, and did not abuse their discretion. See 
Addendum A at R. 58, 1 3. 
Under Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
"[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such finding or conclusion." Where an appellant does 
not provide a transcript in accordance with the rule, a reviewing 
court is incapable of assessing the correctness of the findings, 
and is limited to "reviewfing] the court's legal conclusions for 
consistency with the findings, giving them no deference." 
Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson. 802 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah 
App. 1990). Petitioner has provided no transcript here. 
Therefore, he can succeed on appeal only if the lower court's 
conclusion is inconsistent with the facts as it found them. 
14 
As previously discussed, the court found no evidence showing 
actions by respondents that were in excess of their jurisdiction, 
abusive of their discretion, or noncompliant with governing law, 
and petitioner has not marshalled the evidence to show these 
findings in error. Petitioner's failure of proof cannot be used to 
thrust his burden upon respondents. The court's conclusion that 
respondents regularly pursued their authority is entirely 
consistent with the facts as the court found them, and its 
consequent dismissal of the petition is unassailable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, respondents respectfully 
request the Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
petition in this case. 
Dated this day of December, 1994. 
^? uC. 
v
- Nancyl L. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing order of dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid, to David 
S. Steed, 203 South 1920 West, Provo, UT 84601, this / day of 
February, 1994. 
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State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Tel (801) 261-6464 
Fax (801) 261*481 June 16,1993 
John Kocher, USP# 19261 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Kocher: 
This is to notify you that a Rescission Request has been received at the Board that 
indicates you have disciplinaries. This may effect your current status. Therefore, 
please be prepared to appear before a Board of Pardons Staff Member on June 30, 
1993 at 10:00 am at the Utah State Prison Main Facility; Draper, Utah in a Rescission 
Hearing to discuss this matter. 
In connection with your upcoming hearing, everything in your Board file may be 
considered. Like other offenders' files, your file contains its own variation of the 
following categories of information: 
(1) Public information, including judgment and commitment orders, prior Board 
dispositions, parole agreements, and the like; 
(2) Information generated from Adult Probation and Parole, including presentence 
and postsentence reports, probation violation reports, parole progress and 
violation reports, diagnostic reports, and so forth; 
(3) Prison information, including board reports, disciplinaries, progress and 
rescission reports, psychological, etc.; 
(4) Information generated internally for the Board, including worksheets, routings, 
guideline matrices, alienist reports, warrant requests; 
(5) Other criminal justice information, including police and prosecutorial reports, 
recommendations from sentencing judges, criminal record data, other court 
documents; 
(6) Other correspondence sent to the Board concerning you. 
Any other specific Items of information to be considered by the Board will be identified 
for you at the hearing and you will have an opportunity to respond at that time. 
If you have further questions, please ask your caseworker. 
Sincerely, 
M.R. SIBBETT, CHAIRPERSON 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
Enid O. Pino, Hearing Officer 
Utah State Board of Pardons 
cc: USP Records 0 0 0 4 5 
File 
ADDENDUM C 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The status of KOCHER, JOHN RICHARD , USP No. 19261 , OBSCIS No. 50755 
came before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the 30th day of June, 1993, 
for the following consideration: 
RESCISSION HEARING 
CRIME OF COMMITMENT COURT CASE # JUDGE EXPIRATION 
~I AUTO THEFT 5 6202 PAGE 01/28/1994 
3 THEFT 5 921900119 HYDE 02/10/1997 
ORDER 
After the statement of \Jdr\Y\ KltnAWJ hOdnCK and the following witnesses, 
1) 2) , 
and for good cause appearing, the Board of Pardons made the following decision: 
Rescind of &jtfd> parole date, 
___ Begin parole on ffi///j y3 with the following special conditions: 
i. T.S.P. «. HeMMlSh 6&-IJ tfc *tffj 
Amend parole agreement to add/delete/modify the conditions described above 
___ Terminate sentence (including parole supervision) on 
Expiration of sentence to be effective on 
Schedule rehearing for 
Other: 
The reasons for this decision are.identified on the attached page. 
At the discretion of the Board of Pardons, this decision Is subject to review 
and modification at any time prior to actual release from custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Dtahf I affix my signature on 
behalf of the Chairperson of the Board this 30th day of June, 1993. 
00029 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON 
Jfi^n. /C*t4tA wSSh, HEARING DATE: ^A^A3 Naffie
 u ( K l )v — /&&/ " %<**># HEARING TYPE; ^kfiUaiA*. 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Board of Pardons1 decision is based on the following factors: 
AGGRAVATING MITIGATING 
OFFENDER'S BACKGROUND 
Criminal history significantly underrepresented by guidelines 
(i.e., more than 4 felony convictions and/or 6 misdemeanors) 
History of similar offenses 
Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses . • . 
_____ History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions . . . . . . 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities 
Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity 
Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility 
Multiple incidents and/or victims 
^m^^_^ Personal gain reaped from the offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE 
Motive (intentional, premeditated vs. impulsive, reactionary) . 
Role (organizer, leader vs. follower, minimal participant) • . 
Obstruction of justice vs. early withdrawal or self-surrender . 
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
Extent of injury (physical, emotional, financial, social) 
Relatively vulnerable victim vs. aggressive or provoking victim 
Victim in position of authority over offender 
PRESEN OFFENDERS T CHARACTERISTICS 
Denial or minimization vs. complete acceptance of responsibility Ir 
if Repeated, numerous vs. first incarceration or parole revocation 
Extent of remorse a"n3 apparent motivation to rehabilitate . • . 
^ Timeliness and extent of efforts to pay restitution • • . . . . 
/ Prison programming (effort to enroll, nature of programming) • 
if Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance of authority Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future) t^^ 
Extent of community fear, condemnation • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Degree of meaningful support system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V ^ 
Nature and stability of release plans . m . . . . . . . . . . . _____ 
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other) 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise • • • • • • . • • • 
Lengthy history of alcohol/drug abuse vs. apparent rehabilitation 
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges . • • 
Likely release to detainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
QTHKft 
ADDENDUM D 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 50755 
Consideration of the Status of KOCHER, JOHN RICHARD PRISON NO* 19261 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board 
of Pardons on the 13th day of July, 1993, for: 
RESCISSION HEARING 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
makes the following decision and order: 
RESULTS 
Rescind 08/24/1993 parole. Parole 
effective 12/14/1993. Interim decision of 
06/30/93 affirmed. 
1 Successfully complete ISP Program. 
2 Not consume or possess any alcohol. 
3 Pay restitution of $4308.00 - CASE// 6202. 
4 Pay restitution x>f $624.96 - CASE# 0119. 
No Crime Sent Case No. Judge Expiration 
01/28/1994 
02/10/1997 
1 
3 
AUTO THEFT 
THEFT 
5 6202 PAGE 
5 921900119 HYDE 
This decision Is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at 
any time until actual release from custody* 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 
13th day of Julyf 1993, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
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Cheryl Hansen 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00050755 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 19261 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF KOCHER, JOHN RICHARD 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or 
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons 
in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 13th day of July, 1993, and the 
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to 
appearance 8nd the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that K0CHER, JOHN RICHARD be paroled from the 
funishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the econd District Court in and for the county of Davis, Weber for the crime(s) 
of AUTO THEFT, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 01/28/94; AUTO THEFT, class A 
misdemeanor. Expiration 04/22/90; THEFT, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 
02/10/97. 
The parole tfhall not become effective until 14th dav of December. 1993. 
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by 
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be 
administered by duly authorized agents of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant 
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah 
State Prison or $hall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah 
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law of the State of 
Utah prior to the effective d$te of said parole, then this Order of Parole is 
revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this 13th day of July, 1993. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 
15th day of July# 1993, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and 
hereby affix my signature as Chairman for and on behalf of the State of 
Utah, Board of Pardons. 
tt.R./Sibb^tt, Cheirroa 
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